Licensing China-Origin Assets: Plan, Deal or Stop
Before a Western company signs a licence for a China-origin asset, every open uncertainty should be sorted into one of three categories: it changes the development plan, it changes the deal, or it should stop the deal. The sorting has to happen before signing, while each answer can still change the plan, the price or the decision.
That was my main takeaway from BIO-Europe in Cologne, where on 10 November I presented the case study “Before the Deal: What Western Buyers Must Resolve About China-Origin Evidence and Policy Risk” and moderated the panel “China’s Clinical Revolution: From Regional Player to Global Innovation Engine”. Three questions deserve an answer before a buyer commits.

Evidence fit: a gap changes the development plan
The first question is whether the evidence supports the intended development and market-access strategy in the buyer’s territories. Patient populations, endpoints and standards of care belong in that assessment. In practice, that means asking:
Do the patients in the pivotal trials match the population that the label and the launch markets will cover?
Was the comparator the standard of care in the markets where the buyer intends to launch?
Are the endpoints the ones the regulator, and later payers and health technology assessment bodies, will accept as evidence of benefit?
A gap here does not necessarily end the deal. It changes the development plan: an additional study, a different sequence of markets or a narrower first indication. The plan, and its cost, should be known before the price is.
Why endpoints belong on the list: the ivonescimab decision
In December 2022, Summit Therapeutics in-licensed ivonescimab, known in China as AK112, from the Hong Kong-listed Akeso for the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan, in a deal announced at up to USD 5.0 billion, including USD 500 million upfront (Summit announcement, 6 December 2022).
On 15 November 2026, Summit announced that the FDA had issued a complete response letter for its Biologics License Application for ivonescimab with platinum-containing chemotherapy in locally advanced or metastatic non-small cell lung cancer after prior EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor therapy. According to Summit’s filing, the agency determined that substantial evidence of effectiveness is not established without a statistically significant overall-survival improvement, and that a progression-free-survival benefit without it does not support a positive benefit-risk profile.
The public record is the company’s account of the letter, and I draw no conclusions about the underlying data. The lesson for buyers is narrower: which endpoint the buyer’s own regulator will treat as decisive is a question for the evidence review before signing, not for the submission after it.
Cost of the gaps: these change the deal
The second question is what each remaining gap costs. An additional study, an unresolved dependency or a policy change affects timing, valuation and terms. These items belong in the term sheet, not in a footnote to the valuation model. For each one, the buyer should be able to state:
how much time and money closing the gap requires;
which party bears that cost, and which party controls the work;
which milestone, payment or condition should depend on the outcome.
Policy change deserves the same treatment as clinical risk. A shift in US, European or Chinese policy can move a development timeline or change the value of a territory, and the agreement should say what happens when it does.
Access and oversight: if it cannot be verified, stop
The third question is whether the buyer can access the data and oversee the work needed to develop the asset internationally. Data access, site access and operational responsibilities need to be clear before signing:
Can the buyer obtain the data its own submissions will rely on, in the form its regulators expect?
Can the buyer, and the authorities it answers to, verify the trial sites?
Which party is responsible for each part of international development, and is that written into the agreement?
If the data or the sites cannot be verified, that should stop the deal. A buyer cannot defend evidence before its own regulator that it was not able to check.
Bring the right functions in before the terms are set
The practical lesson is to bring business development, clinical, regulatory, market-access and policy colleagues into the discussion early enough to influence the decision. A finding that arrives after the terms are set can delay a deal; it can no longer shape it.
That is the focus of my work at SILREAL: helping Western life-sciences companies see how policy and market-access conditions across China, Europe and the US affect their decisions, including the decision not to proceed.
My thanks to Seemi Khan, Stella Gu Placzek and Echo Hindle-Yang for their perspectives on development evidence, trial execution and investment decisions, and to the BIO-Europe team for the invitation.
To test whether this applies to your asset or market: https://meetings.silreal.com/meetings/silreal-gmbh
First published on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7527992793198149633/



